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Abstract
It is a widely observed fact that in many European countries, re-
gions of low population density get subsidies that are not justiﬁed by
their size. This paper throws some light on the eﬀect of this phenom-
enon on location of manufacturing activities. Considering a simple
two-region economic geography model enriched to allow for endoge-
nously determined regional policy, we ﬁnd that, once the political
economics of regional policy is explicitly considered, region size has
an ambiguous eﬀect in determining the equilibrium regional subsidy,
while it still plays a key role in the determination of the equilibrium
share of industrial activities. In particular the ﬁnal allocation of ﬁrms
will depend both on the relative economic strength of the two regions,
as predicted by more orthodox economic geography models, and by
their relative political weight.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The attempt to avoid the de-location process associated with trade integra-
tion has been one of the main concerns of European policy makers during
the last decade. State aids to rural regions in various European countries
and the European Union’s Structural Funds’ allocation are issues tackled by
hot political debates. In this context we often observe that interests of rela-
tively small groups are given an exceptional weight if compared to the groups’
size. It is widely recognized, for example, that rural population’s concerns in
developed economies receive an attention that is hardly explained by these
groups’ electoral force (e.g., farmers account for about only 5% of the French
or Swiss populations). In the 1994-99 budget period, people living in ”Ob-
jective 1” European regions, i.e. in regions whose per capita GDP is below
the 75% of the EU’s average GDP, were about the 25% of the total European
population. Over the same period, the European Union’s Structural Funds,
which are mainly used to ﬁnance aids to poor regions, represented 1/3 of the
EU total budget, coming second to the CAP only.
With the exception of a few recent examples, the existing literature on
economic geography does not consider the political aspects of integration.
When it does, it either treats the instruments of regional policy as exoge-
nously determined (Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 2000, Martin 1999, Martin
and Rogers 1995, Ottaviano and Thisse 1999) or addresses the speciﬁci s s u eo f
tax-competition among diﬀerent constituencies (Andersson and Forslid 1999,
Baldwin and Krugman 2001, Kind, Midelfart-Knarvick and Schjelderup 2000,
Ludema and Wooton 2000). The aim of the present paper is to address the
issue of agglomeration during a process of regional integration with policy
choices of the centralized government endogenously determined. In what fol-
lows, deepening integration has an impact on location of economic activities.
Regional policy is designed in such a way that it can inﬂuence the agglom-
eration process. The level and the direction of the regional intervention is
determined by the political economy game among agents. Before turning
to the development of the model, we brieﬂy discuss the main characteris-
tics of the economic geography and of the political economy elements of our
framework.
The economic model we propose is in the tradition of the so-called ”new
economic geography” àl aFujita, Krugman and Venables (1999). Particu-
larly we will be working on a simpliﬁed version of the Flam-Helpman adap-
tation of the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition model. Firms of a two-
2asymmetric-region country produce a diﬀerentiated product using one unit of
capital (the ﬁxed cost) and a per-unit-of-output amount of labor (the variable
cost). By assumption, capital is cross-regionally mobile, but capital owners
are not, that is, if the capital owner does not live in the region where her
unit of capital is used, then the reward on this unit is ”repatriated” to the
region where she lives. Labor is perfectly mobile only across sectors within
ar e g i o n .
The interaction of increasing returns to scale at the ﬁrm level and trans-
portation costs gives rise to the traditional home market eﬀect (Krugman
1980). As it is well-known, new economic geography models predict that, if
a country has an idiosyncratic large demand for one type of good which is
produced under increasing returns to scale and if trade of that good is not
completely free, that country will attract a more than proportional share of
the total industrial activity and will end up exporting the good, contrary to
what the neoclassical literature on international trade would predict.
The fact that capital income is repatriated and that labor is immobile
across regions breaks the ”circular causality” processes typical of more gen-
eral economic geography models. Consequently, our model will not feature
any catastrophic agglomeration properties, allowing us to get analytical re-
sults once we endogenise regional policy. (As is well known, models that
display catastrophic agglomeration in a context of asymmetric regions are
typically not analytically solvable, even without adding any endogenous re-
gional policy variable.)
State intervention at the regional level could take any form, from in-
frastructure spending to tax reduction and so on so forth. To be concrete we
will focus on a location subsidy consisting in a per-ﬁrm ﬁxed cost cut. As
such, given that the ﬁxed cost consists only of capital, the location subsidy is,
in fact, a subsidy to capital (and, at equilibrium, to the level of production).
Capital owners who set up their ﬁrm in the subsidized region will receive the
subsidy independently on where they live. The interaction between the two
regions at the political level will determine the direction and the amount of
the regional subsidy.
Sectorial concerns are likely to be transmitted to the decision makers
through lobbying activities (see e.g. Becker 1983, Grossman and Helpman
1995, Olson 1965). However, when we look at regional issues, as we do here,
we see regions as spatial entities and not as sectors. Being often recognized
as distinct entities in the political system, regions are more likely to inﬂuence
the policy outcome directly, i.e. through elections. Hence, we will not rely
3on a lobbying approach in order to characterize the political game. Rather,
we use a Hotelling-Downs probabilistic-voting model (Hinich 1977, Ledyard
1984).1 In addition to the policy dimension that characterizes median-voter
models, swing-voter models (as they are also referred to) feature a second,
political, dimension: voters are endowed with non-policy preferences over the
two parties (’ideology’, say). The economic-policy dimension is, by assump-
tion, orthogonal to ’ideology’ and candidates know voters’ preferences on the
economic issue, but only their distribution over the political dimension.
Still with a median-voter kind of model in mind, this will shift the equi-
librium policy variable in favor of the small region as the candidates now
maximize a sort of weighted social welfare function (see Persson and Tabellini
2000, chapter 3). Moreover, we assume that the population in the urban re-
gion is more spread along the political dimension than in the small, rural one.
We do so on the ground that in more urbanized regions economic activities
and, hence, special interests are more variegated than in less urbanized ones
(or, equivalently, that regional policy is less salient an issue).2
The fact that small groups have sometimes a disproportionate political
power is not new in the literature. Alternative explanations exist. For in-
stance, small groups can presumably circumvent the fee-rider problem in
getting organized as pressure groups more easily (Olson 1965). Or, the elec-
toral system might incite competing candidates to appeal on narrowly deﬁned
and speciﬁc groups rather than more broadly (Myerson 1993, Persson and
Tabellini 2000, chapter 8).
In our geography model, this fact has interesting implications: once re-
gional policy is considered as a political issue, if the rural region is politically
over-represented, economic integration does not necessarily leads to agglom-
eration of industries in the larger region, as the orthodox geography model
would predict. The location of economic activities, which is, indeed, the ulti-
mate concern of the voters, will depend both on the economic home-market
eﬀect and on what we call the vote-market eﬀect by analogy. For a low level
of economic integration, we get some sort of dispersion (neither region at-
tracts all ﬁrms); close to full integration, a core-periphery pattern emerges.
Our key result is that, at the political economy equilibrium, the big region
will attract the core if (and only if) its relative economic strength (due to
1See Coughlin (1992) for an exhaustive analysis of the probabilistic voting approach to
representative democracy.
2This stylized fact - that larger cities tend to be more diversiﬁed - is one of many on
city diversity and specialisation, as surveyed by Duranton and Puga (2000).
4its larger size) overcomes its eventual relative political weakness (due to the
higher dispersion of population along the political dimension). Finally, and
interestingly, the direction of the equilibrium subsidy is ambiguous, being
aﬀected both by pure economic variables (via the home-market eﬀect) and
political ones (via the vote-market eﬀect), even if the equilibrium spatial
allocation of industry never is.
This is partly due to the fact that agglomeration is self-reinforcing, and
so there are quasi-rents that can be taxed in the core without leading to
re-location. There is a bunch of recent studies on this precise point (see ref-
erences on tax competition above). Taking the geography as given, Ludema
and Wooton (2000), for instance, show how competing constituencies set re-
distributive taxes to attract the mobile factor owners. Possibly justiﬁed by
a median voter approach in which the immobile factor owners would rep-
resent the majority in each country, each government sets its tax rate non-
cooperatively, maximizing its constituency’s welfare. Interestingly, and by
opposition to the classical approach to tax competition, they ﬁnd that eco-
nomic integration may reduce the intensity of tax competition, the reason
being that loosing industry is less costly when integration is deep enough, as
location has a lower impact on welfare. This eﬀect is present in our model as
well. We will see that a core-periphery structure necessarily emerges for some
positive barrier to trade at the political-economy equilibrium, even though
voters from the two regions still disagree on the preferred outcome.
Also in Persson and Tabellini (1992) two policy makers, each from a
diﬀerent region or country, compete for the mobile factor (capital) setting
taxes. They consider how equilibrium redistributive policies are aﬀected by
economic integration in a more classical environment (i.e. they focus on
public good provision in populations with heterogenous factor ownerships
rather than on economic geography issues). By contrast, we assume that
both regions belong to the same constituency and focus exclusively on the
interaction between spatial redistribution politics and geography.3
Our major contribution is to assess the eﬀects of politics on the spa-
tial distribution of economic activity. More precisely, taking a laissez-faire
equilibrium as a benchmark, we show how politics and economic integration
interact both ways to speed up or slow down the agglomeration process that
results from integration. In particular, and in this setting, our assumption
3Some extensions along the lines of Persson and Tabellini (2000, chapters 7-8) are
brieﬂy undertaken by one of the authors in Baldwin et al. (2001).
5that the small, rural region is over-represented at the political equilibrium
translates into a slowing down. It is interesting to compare these results with
Martin (1999). The latter study suggests that current EU regional policies
aimed at reducing income inequalities among regions are either not deliver-
ing or bad for aggregate growth and that only subsidies to innovation have
a positive eﬀect on both.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces
the basic economic model and solves it taking the policy variable as given.
Section 3 presents the reduced form of the welfare functions and discusses
how utility is aﬀected by the policy choice, still exogenously given. In Sec-
tion 4 the economic model is integrated into a political economy model and
solved together. Section 5 discusses the results and section 6 concludes. The
Appendix contains a guide to tedious calculations.
2 The Basic Economic Model
The model is based on the Flam-Helpman (1987) version of the Dixit-Stiglitz
(1977) monopolistic competition.4 We consider two potentially asymmetric
regions, Urban (U)a n dR u r a l( R), belonging to the same country, endowed
with two factors, labor (L)a n dc a p i t a l( K), and each producing a homoge-
nous good, Y ,a n dad i ﬀerentiated good, X. The production of the latter
involves increasing returns to scale and its interregional trade is characterized
by transportation costs. The interaction between increasing returns to scale
and impediments to trade gives rise to the home market eﬀect. In this sense,
our is a new economic geography model.
2.1 Assumptions
Both labor and capital are used to produce the diﬀerentiated good X under
increasing return to scale and monopolistic competition. Following Flam
and Helpman, production of each X-variety involves a one-time ﬁxed cost
consisting of one unit of K and a per-unit-of-output cost consisting of ax
units of L.
The Y sector produces a homogenous good under constant return to scale
and perfect competition using only labor as an input. This good is also chosen
4To our knowledge, Martin and Rogers (1995) were the ﬁrst to use this kind of model
in a new economic geography framework.
6as the numeraire.
Labor is perfectly mobile across sectors, but immobile across regions. For
simplicity, the mass of labor available at the country level is set equal to 1.
The speciﬁcf a c t o rK is regionally mobile but capital owners are not, hence,
capital income is fully repatriated to their region of residence.
Inter-regional trade of the diﬀerentiated good is subject to iceberg trans-
portation costs. Thus, in order to sell one unit of X in the other region,
τ > 1 units need to be shipped. Y trade is costless.
The representative consumer in each region maximizes the following quasi-
linear utility function:









where σ > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution among the X-varieties,
and N and NR stand for the number of ﬁr m si nU r b a na n di nR u r a lr e -
spectively, and, given the assumption on the market structure, also for the
number of varieties of the diﬀerentiated good produced in each region.5 Each
consumer in the rural region owns one unit of labor and KR/LR units of cap-
ital; the typical individual in the urban region owns one unit of labor and
K/L units of capital. Her budget constraint therefore is:
w + ρK/L = T +
Z N+NR
i=0
c(i)p(i)di + Y ,( 2 )
where ρ is the capital reward gross of (locally speciﬁc) capital subsidies,
and T are the per-capita taxes paid by the representative consumer in order
to cover any policy intervention chosen by the government. Observe that
these taxes are non-distortionary; other (potentially interesting) policy im-
plications would be implied if distorting instruments were implemented. The
same budget constraint holds, mutatis mutandis, for the rural region (with
TR = T). Note that variables pertaining to the rural region are subscribed
with an R, while those pertaining to the urban one are un-subscribed, un-
less there is risk of confusion; in that case they will be subscribed with a
5The choice of a quasi-linear speciﬁcation, which is fairly standard in the literature
on public goods (e.g., see Persson and Tabellini 2000), is harmless: all results carry over
if a Cobb-Douglas functional form is chosen instead (calculations are available from the
authors). The logarithmic speciﬁcation, on the other hand, is a handy assumption that
helps us to get closed form solutions, as we shall see later.
7U. Aggregate variables, i.e. variables referring to the nation as a whole, are
indicated with the subscript C,f o rCountry.
We assume that the intervention consists of a subsidy to ﬁrm’s ﬁxed
costs. As such subsidies are independent of output and, given that the one-
time ﬁxed cost consists of one unit of K, they actually represent a subsidy
to capital.6 Let r be the net capital reward for entrepreneurs producing in
region U, rR the one for those producing in R,a n dθ = r/rR their ratio,
with θ ∈ <++. When rural production is subsidized, θ > 1 and θ − 1 is
the ad-valorem subsidy given to capital owners who produce in that region,
regardless of their origin. Under these circumstances, θrR is the capital
reward for producing in R and r is the capital reward for producing in U.
When θ < 1, 1/θ − 1 is the ad-valorem subsidy given to capital owners
producing in region U. In this case, capital owners that set up their ﬁrms in
Urban get r/θ, those setting up their ﬁrms in Rural get rR. Clearly θ =1
means that capital is not subsidized anywhere and the lower is |θ − 1|,t h e
smaller is the subsidy. In what follows the location subsidy is determined
implicitly as a result of the political game between the two regions. The fact
that at most one region is subsidized at a time is a simplifying assumption.
It is anyway possible to show that this would remain true in equilibrium even
in the more general case in which both regions can be subsidized.7
2.2 Equilibrium conditions
As usual with quasi-linear utility functions, the quantity of Y consumed by
the representative consumer is determined as a residual from (2). Standard







Competition implies marginal-cost pricing in the Y sector, and, with
Y as numeraire, w = pY =1 . Free trade in Y and perfect labor mobility
between sectors guarantees labor reward equalization in both regions, namely
6Because of free-entry, though, at equilibrium this will be equivalent to a subidy to the
value of sales (estimated at f.o.b. prices) and hence to the quantity of output.
7Calculations are available from the authors
8w = wR =1 , as long as neither specializes. For simplicity we rule out
complete specialization, so that nominal wage equality always holds.8
We choose units such that ax =1 −1/σ and solve the ﬁrst order conditions
for Urban and Rural ﬁrms for equilibrium prices. Adopting the usual conven-
tion for which the ﬁrst subscript indicates the region where the good is pro-
duced and the second the region where it is consumed, the standard monop-
olistic competition pricing equations are pUU = pRR =1and pUR = pRU = τ.
Competition for K drives r up to the level where pure proﬁts are elimi-
nated, so K’s reward in Urban is the operating proﬁt of a typical Urban-based
X-ﬁrm. A similar condition holds in Rural.9 When production takes place in
both regions, perfect capital mobility equalizes the gross rewards to capital
across regions, i.e. ρ = ρR in equilibrium. Due to subsidies, however, net
rewards - namely r and rR -c a nd i ﬀer. In particular, when setting a ﬁrm in
region R is subsidized (and, hence, θ > 1) ρ = ρR = r = θrR.W h e nθ < 1,
namely when ﬁrms in Urban are subsidized, ρ = ρR = rR = r/θ.
Since X-ﬁrms need one unit of capital per variety, and capital is in-
terregionally mobile (even though its reward is repatriated), capital’s full-
employment condition requires N + NR = K + KR.
As usual, monopolistic competition implies that operating proﬁt( n a m e l y
revenue less payment to labor) is pUUx/σ for a typical Urban ﬁrm and
pRRxR/σ for a typical Rural ﬁrm (making use of the fact that f.o.b. prices are
the same for the units that are exported and those that are sold locally). The
equilibrium size of a typical ﬁrm is therefore proportional to capital’s reward,
namely x = rσ and xR = rRσ (Flam and Helpman, 1987). The equalization
of gross rental rates enforced by capital mobility implies that θ = x/xR as
well. Therefore, the equalization of equilibrium ﬁrm size holds if, and only if,
θ =1 . Moreover, the value of global X-sector output at producer prices must
equal the value of global X-sector private expenditure. The market-clearing
condition in U requires that pUUNx= LNpUUcUU+LRNpURcUR,w h e r ecUU
and cUR are deﬁned by equation (3). By the same token, the market-clearing
condition in R is pRRNRxR = LRNRpRRcRR + LNRpRUcRU. Making use of
equation (3) and substituting the appropriate optimal price, we obtain the
8In order to exclude complete specialization in production, it is enough to assume that
the large region is not big enough to supply all the Y demand. In particular, a suﬃcient
condition for that being true is that the biggest region’s labor share, sL ≡ L
L+LR,i sl e s s
that 1/σ.
9Seeing K as the speciﬁc factor to sector X, capital receives the agglomeration (quasi-)
rents.














where 0 ≤ φ ≡ τ1−σ ≤ 1 is a measure of freeness of inter-regional trade. φ
ranges from zero, with inﬁnite barriers, to unity, with zero barriers. As (4)
also holds in autarchy (with φ =0and N = K), the autarchy r is lower in
the capital-abundant region.
With capital mobility, the number of varieties produced in a region may
diﬀer from the region’s capital stock, so we also have to determine the equilib-
rium location of X-ﬁrms. The zero proﬁt and the market clearing conditions
can be used to ﬁnd the equilibrium levels for N and NR and, simultaneously,
the equilibrium scales x and xR. However, since the total number of X-ﬁrms
is ﬁxed at K + KR, it is more convenient for our purposes to focus on the
ratio N/NR ≡ ν ( r a t h e rt h a no nl e v e l s ) .H a v i n gd e ﬁned L/LR as λ,t h e r e f o r e
we get:
ν =
(1 − θφ)λ − φ(θ − φ)
(θ − φ) − λφ(1 − θφ)
.( 5 )
Expression (5) holds for admissible values of ν, namely when parameters are
such that 0 < ν < +∞. Outside this parameter space, ν equals zero or
+∞ in an obvious manner. By inspection, U’s share of ﬁrms (deﬁned as
sN = ν
1+ν) is increasing in U’s size (deﬁned as sL = λ
1+λ) and decreasing
in its relative cost of capital, θ.M o r e o v e r , ν is larger than λ if λ > 1 > θ
(not immediate, but true); these inequalities illustrate eﬀects that will be
recurrent in the sequel. Under the following working assumption, which will
hold from now on, ν is also increasing with φ.
Assumption 1: U is the largest region, i.e. sL > 1/2 (or λ > 1).
We will sometimes refer to λ as the relative economic strength of
region U (or,equivalently, as the relative economic weakness of
region R).
Expression (5) is the fulcrum of our analysis, so it is worth studying it in
the absence of subsidies, i.e. when θ =1 . In this case the equilibrium ratio





10When U is larger, making trade freer (dφ > 0) results in a de-location of ﬁrms
to the big region. This is consistent with other models in the same spirit.
Note that ν →∞for φ =1 /λ < 1 (core-periphery outcome for suﬃciently






(1 − λφ)2 > 1 (7)
for values of φ such that (5) yields an interior solution, i.e. for φ < 1/λ ≡ φ
CP
(home market eﬀect, Krugman 1980).
In order to isolate the eﬀect of a subsidy on the ﬁrm allocation share, we
calculate the ratio ν at λ =1(equal sized regions) and take the ﬁrst derivative
with respect to 1/θ. Using (5), it is easy to show that ∂ν
∂(1/θ) |λ=1> 1.T h i s
says that one additional unit of subsidy given to U leads to a more than
proportional change in de-location towards U. We call this property the
home subsidy eﬀect. Both the home market and the home subsidy eﬀect will
be used in the following sections to help boost intuition.
Equilibrium Y -sector output is determined as a residual from (2).
In order to close the model we need to specify a functional form for
T, the per-capita tax level. We will deal with this issue at the end of the
following section. We now turn to a brief discussion about the regional policy
instrument we consider.
3T h e E c o n o m i c E ﬀects of Regional Policy
In this section we analyze the economic eﬀect of the regional subsidization
taking its level as given. In the next section the regional policy will be
endogenously determined.
The regional policy instrument implemented by the central government
in order to aﬀect inter-regional industrial location consists in giving a subsidy
on the ﬁrms’ ﬁxed cost in one of the two regions.
To focus on the real-income, cross-regional distribution problem, we make
the following additional assumption:
Assumption 2: per-capita endowments of capital and labor are
the same for each individual across regions, that is, KR/LR =
K/L.10 As a consequence, K
K+KR = sL (or K/KR = λ).
10By factor prices equalization, their nominal incomes are also equal.
11Under this assumption, sL is also region U’s share of the country’s nominal
income and expenditure. Hence, economic agents diﬀer only with respect to
the region they live in, and have only one reason of disagreement: ceteris
paribus, they all prefer the ﬁrms to locate where they live since the retail
price is lower for goods produced at home than for goods imported from the
other region (recall that the inter-regional transportation cost is fully passed
on to the consumer).
Cross-factor distribution issues, which are at stake in the literature on
tax competition (see, e.g., Ludema and Wooton’s 2000), are left aside here,
and taxation of the mobile factor does not inﬂuence income distribution
across agents. Nevertheless, as in the tax competition literature, also here
taxes on the mobile factor are set so as to aﬀect location, and hence cross-
region income distribution (through the cost-of-living, or price-index). The
fact that for low trade costs, location looses salience as an issue, and hence
raising taxes may still induce the mobile factor owners to move, but this is
less costly as ’imports’ are now cheaper, translates in our model into the fact
that a core-periphery structure will necessarily emerge for some positive φ at
the political-economy equilibrium, even though voters from the two regions
still disagree on the preferred outcome.
3.1 Location eﬀects
We ﬁr s tl o o ka tt h ee ﬀect of the policy parameter θ on the equilibrium
location, sN.
Let θ and θ be the values of θ such that sN equals zero (all ﬁrms are












2 > φ.( 8 )
Under Assumption 1, θ > θ and θ > 1.
Figure 1 plots θ (dashed curve) and θ (solid curve) as a function of trade
freeness for a given value of sL. θ shows the minimum level of Rural subsi-
dization necessary to attract all ﬁrms to R. For values less than one, θ shows
11Note that, when θ is smaller than θ or bigger than θ, the usual relations ρ = r = θrR
and ρ = rR = r/θ do not hold anymore. In particular, for θ < θ,a l lt h eﬁrms are located
in U and capital owners get ρ = r/θ, independently on where they live. If θ > θ,t h e yg e t
ρ = θrR.
12the minimum subsidy to Urban which is necessary to make U the core; for
values above one, θ shows the maximum tax to U which is consistent with
no ﬁrms leaving Urban.
Figure1 near here
As it is possible to see from the dashed curve, the freer is trade, the
smaller is the subsidy required to attract all the ﬁrms to R (liberalization
ampliﬁes the eﬀect of a subsidy). Note that, since θ > 1 ∀φ,t h em i n i m u m
level of subsidy to industries in R that makes the rural region the core is
always positive: a positive regional policy is necessary in order to oﬀset the
tendency to lose ﬁrms as φ rises in the small region, due to the home market
eﬀect.
The converse is not necessarily true, as a look at θ (the solid curve) shows:
the relationship between the level of subsidies to ﬁrms located in U which
is necessary to keep all the ﬁrms in the same region and the level of trade
integration is bell-shaped (by inspection of equation (8)). The reason is that
the home-market eﬀect works in favor of the large region, so that a small tax
on ﬁrms there (or, equivalently, a small subsidy on potential ﬁrms in R)i s
ineﬀective in making any ﬁrm move to R for φ > 1/λ.12
It is also instructive to consider the eﬀectiveness of a given level of Rural
subsidy along the integration path. In particular consider what the location
eﬀects would be at a raising φ with the level of θ ﬁxed at θf in the diagram.
When φ is relatively close to zero, there is some economic activity in both
regions, since θ ∈ (θ,θ). As the two regions become more integrated, for θ
kept constant at θf, the home market eﬀect starts dominating the subsidy
eﬀect. From point a on, the relative strength of the home market eﬀect is
so reinforced by an ongoing integration process that this level of subsidy to
industrial activity in R is completely ineﬀective and Rural becomes the pe-
riphery region (1 − sN =0 ) in spite of the subsidy on oﬀer. As φ continues
to increase, the relative strength of the home market eﬀect decreases and
eventually, when point b is reached, some of the ﬁrms start leaving the core
U (which is hence no longer a core). Things get even worse for U as trans-
portation costs fall further: to the right of point c t h ec o r ei si nR.A g a i n ,i f
12The fact that taxing capital in the Core does not necessarily lead it to relocate comes
in sharp contrast to the classical results on tax competition, as Andersson and Forslid
(1999), Baldwin and Krugman (2001), Kind et al. (2000) and Ludema and Wooton (2000)
forcefully show.
13we take the model literally, this shows how eﬀective regional policy is when
φ → 1: without any subsidy (θ =1 ) ,t h ec o r ew o u l db e( a n dr e m a i n )i n
Urban from point a0 onwards.
Lastly note that an increase in sL makes the home market eﬀect become
stronger. As it is possible to see from equation (8), a higher value of sL makes
both θ and θ shift upward (see arrows in ﬁgure 1). The upward movement
of θ indicates that, given φ, in order to compensate the fact that ﬁrms are
attracted by the big market, the minimum subsidy to R production needed
to keep the core in Rural has now to be higher. Likewise, the upward shift
of θ implies that the minimum subsidy level needed to assure the core to
U is now lower, and also that the range of trade freeness for which a small
subsidy oﬀered to location in R is still compatible with the core remaining
in U is now wider.
To sum up, three conclusions arise from this analysis.
Result 1:a tag i v e ns u b s i d yl e v e lθf, potentially there exists a
non-monotonic relationship between trade integration and equi-
librium location.
Result 2: when trade is highly integrated, location is very sensi-
tive to policy.
Result 3:a ssL increases, the home market eﬀect becomes stronger;
the same level of subsidies ensures sN =1for smaller φ’s and
higher subsidies are needed in order to empty the big region.
3.2 Taxation and welfare eﬀects
In the present model the central government’s regional policy is ﬁnanced
exclusively by taxes. In order to understand how the direction and the level
of the subsidy translates into individuals’ welfare, we ﬁrst need to deﬁne the
per-capita level of taxes as a function of θ. When the subsidy is given to
production plants located in region U,i . e . w h e nθ < 1,a n dr e m e m b e r i n g
that L + LR ≡ 1, each individual in the country pays:
T =( 1 /θ − 1)Nr.( 9 )
On the other hand, if the plants in R get the subsidy, θ > 1 and:
T =( θ − 1)NRrR. (10)
14N and NR are given by (5) or by 0 and K + KR when relevant.
Plugging (2)-(4) and (9) or, alternatively, (10) into (1) and making use
of the deﬁnition of ρ, of the relationship between the equilibrium sizes (x
and xR) and the operating proﬁts (r and rR), and of the pricing equations,
we obtain the materialistic indirect utility functions of the two regions (see
Appendix 1 for details). In particular, for θ ∈ Θ ≡ [θ,θ]:13
VU(sN(θ);sL,φ)=




















where sN is given by (5) and ∂VU/∂sN > 0, ∂VR/∂sN < 0 and ∂sN/∂θ < 0,
so that, in the interval of interest, VU (VR) is always decreasing (increasing)
in θ.
Figure 2 near here
Figure 2 shows the materialistic indirect utility functions in the two re-
gions as a function of θ and for a given value of φ. Citizens get as capital
owners what they pay as tax payers. Hence, an increase in θ has two oppo-
site revenue eﬀects that perfectly compensate each other. At the same time,
citizens would also be made better oﬀ by a reduction of the price index, for
the determination of which, given the presence of trade costs, ﬁrms’ location
turns out to be important. When subsidies belong to Θ and ﬁrms are still lo-
cated in both regions it’s not only the degree of liberalization that has welfare
eﬀects: aﬀecting location, and hence, in turn, the price index, also the level
of subsidies do inﬂuence welfare. Outside Θ ≡ [θ,θ],i n s t e a d ,θ has no inﬂu-
ence on location anymore and the only thing that can lower the CES price
index of the region that has become the periphery is an increase in freeness.
The dashed curves show how welfare is aﬀe c t e db ya ni n c r e a s ei nt h ed e g r e e
of integration. When production happens in both regions, a deepening in
freeness of trade positively aﬀects both regions’ welfare. When production
is concentrated in one of the two regions, only the periphery beneﬁts from a
deepening in trade integration.
With the reduced form of the economic model at hand, we turn to the
political model.
13Incidentally, note that Θ is a function of φ.
154 The Political Economy Model
Until now we have taken the policy variable, θ, as given. We now let it
be endogenously determined by a speciﬁc political process. Recall that the
regional policy instrument under analysis is a subsidy to setting up a ﬁrm
in one of the regions. Both regions belong to the same country. All voters,
whether living in region U or in region R, chose a candidate from the same
set of candidates. This set is exogenously given for simplicity.
4.1 Assumptions
To model the political game we make use of a variant of the Hotelling-Ledyard
model (see Ledyard, 1984) and assume that the policy space, Θ ≡ [θ,θ],
is one-dimensional;14 the set of candidates {A,B} is ﬁxed and ﬁnite; each
candidate cares only about winning and is assumed to maximize her expected
number of votes; the number of citizens, whose preferences are monotonic
over Θ,i sﬁnite and equal to L + LR; candidates simultaneously choose
ap o s i t i o ni nΘ; having observed the candidates’ platform, voters decide
whether to vote or not and, if so, for which candidate. Voting is costless.
More precisely, our formulation of the probabilistic voting model follows
Lindbeck and Weibull (1987).15 Each of the two candidates competing for
oﬃce belongs to a distinct, well established political party. Each party has
a well known (by history) position, which is supposed to remain unchanged
in the future, on several diﬀerent issues (think of issues like EU member-
ship, the role of trade unions, gun control, commitment to free-trade...). By
hypothesis, candidates cannot deviate from their respective party’s position
on these issues, either because they share it or because the internal party
structure makes it impossible to her to do so. Nevertheless, they have some
leeway on other dimensions and any promise they make on these during the
electoral campaign is credible either because parties are divided on them or
because these issues are not too salient to them (winning is the only concern
of the two candidates). In our framework we assume that the only dimension
on which candidates can make a credible promise is the regional policy.
14The policy space could actually be any interval that encompass Θ, but, since any
θ smaller than θ or bigger than θ yield the same location and the same materialistic
utility levels of θ and θ respectively, we can restrict the policy space to Θ without loss of
generality.
15See Persson Tabellini (2000, chapter 3) for a simpliﬁed version.
16Each individual i is assumed to have an idiosyncratic preference of in-
tensity εi f o re i t h e rc a n d i d a t e ,w i t hεi > 0 if i prefers B and εi < 0 if i
prefers A.T h i si sp r i v a t ei n f o r m a t i o nt oi. However, in the two regions all εi
are drawn from a symmetric, with mean zero cumulative distribution func-
tion, FU(ε)i nr e g i o nU and FR(ε)i nR, that is known to anybody (in other
terms there is no aggregate uncertainty). Presumably social and economic
activities are more variegated and heterogeneous in the big region, implying
that distinct socio-economic groups, each having distinct interests, are more
numerous in Urban. This translates in a higher dispersion of the cumulative
distribution around the mean in U.H e n c e ,i fµ2 is the variance of FU(ε)a n d
η2 the variance of FR(ε), µ>η.16 We assume that FU and FR fulﬁll the
suﬃcient conditions for a Nash equilibrium to exist (see Proposition 3 in the
appendix).
Voters derive their utility both from consumption of good X -w h o s e
price is inﬂuenced by geography and hence by regional policy - and by the
winning candidate’s party traditional policies, assumed to be unrelated to
consumption of good X for simplicity.17 Hence, individual i’s welfare is
Vj[sN (θB)]+εji if candidate B wins and Vj[sN (θA)] otherwise, with j = U,R.
4.2 The game
The two candidates announce their platforms, θA and θB, simultaneously
and non-cooperatively, taking the platform of the opponent as given. The
probability of winning for each of them is equal to 0, 1/2 or 1, respectively,
whenever the expected vote share is smaller than, equal to, or larger than
1/2.I np a r t i c u l a r ,g i v e nt h a ta ni n d i v i d u a li in region j is indiﬀerent between
the two candidates if, and only if, Vj[sN (θA)] − Vj[sN (θB)] = εji, candidate
A maximizes
16Exactly the same results are obtained assuming that FU(ε)a n dF R(ε) are identical
(or equivalently that the εi’s are drawn from a common, symmetric, with mean zero
cumulative distribution), but that agglomeration of industry is a more salient issue to
those voters left behind in the periphery than to those living in the core, as it presumably
is. In aggregate terms, these interpretations are equivalent, as pointed out by a referee.
17In other terms, the long term party political dimention and regional policy are or-
thogonal to each other. The presence of this other dimention leads to qualitative results
that are quite diﬀerent from the predictions of a uni-dimetional median voter model. See




B) ≡ sLFU [VU[sN (θA)] − VU[sN (θ
∗
B)]]
+(1− sL)FR [VR[sN (θA)] − VR[sN (θ
∗
B)]] (13)
the problem being symmetric for candidate B. Notice that, due to (5), max-
imizing with respect to θ is equivalent to maximizing with respect to sN.
Given the way the problem has been set up, at equilibrium the two candi-
dates will converge to the same platform. Therefore, the ﬁrst order condition












and the second order condition is satisﬁed by assumption. Notice that, due to
standard statistical properties of probability distribution functions belonging




η ≡ m.T h e r a t i o m measures the relative
political strength of the two regions.
In (14), sLfU (0) and (1 − sL)fR (0) represent the mass of swing voters
respectively in U and in R, namely the mass of those voters that are mar-
ginally indiﬀerent between the two candidates at equilibrium. This mass is
increasing with the size of the electorate (sL and 1−sL) and inversely related
to the spread of the population along the political dimension (µ and η).
We now have all the elements to discuss the equilibrium of the model as
aw h o l e .
5 The Equilibrium
Having plugged equations (11)-(12) and (5) in (14), and using the deﬁnition
m ≡
µ





(1 − φ) (15)
for θ ∈ Θ. θ
∗ equals θ or θ in the obvious way otherwise.
Plugging θ







Simple derivations give the expected signs for the following partial deriva-
tives: ∂ν∗
∂λ > 0 and ∂ν∗
∂m < 0 (a region’s share of industry increases with its
sizes and political weight).
Many interesting results steam from equations (15) and (16). Since the
ultimate concern of voters is to attract economic activities in the region where
they live, let’s focus ﬁrst on ν∗. As it is clear from (16), once we introduce the
political dimension as a determinant of the policy decision, the equilibrium
industry share does not depend anymore only on the economic forces at work.
Indeed,
Result 4: The equilibrium share of industry of any region is in-
creasing with its size (essentially an economic parameter) and its
homogeneity (a socio-economico political parameter), which re-
ﬂects the relative salience of the regional policy for those living
in that region.
The ﬁrst of these two eﬀects is well known and is an alternative formu-
lation of the standard home market eﬀect. The second one is new and is
dubbed here as vote-market eﬀect by analogy. Recall that in the standard
model (i.e. with m =1 ) the home-market eﬀect is deﬁned as: ∂ν∗
∂λ > 1 if, and
only if, λ > 1. Likewise, when the two regions have the same size (λ =1 ),






m)2 > 1 if, and only if, m<1.
In order to determine what we deﬁne the net-market eﬀect, i.e. the out-
come when both the home-market and the vote-market eﬀects interact, we
introduce a new variable λSWING = λ
m, representing the overall relative force
of the two regions. Particularly, λSWING is the ratio of the number of swing




(1−sL)µ.I ti se a s yt oc h e c kt h a t ∂ν∗
∂λSWING =
1−φ2
(1−φλSWING)2 > 1 if,
and only if, λSWING > 1. In other terms,
Result 5: the net-market eﬀect works in favor of the region that
has the largest number of swing voters.
To put it diﬀerently, in equilibrium, the big region U will end up attract-
ing a more than proportional number of ﬁrms only if its economic strength
19(λ > 1) more than compensate its political weakness due to the higher dis-
persion of its population over the political dimension (m>1). Conversely
the economically small region can attract a more than proportional number
of ﬁrms if it has enough political power, i.e. if it has a suﬃciently large
number of swing voters. Thus, when the vote-market eﬀect is added to the
basic model, predictions may diﬀer from those induced by the standard eco-
nomic home market eﬀect and the political game may qualitatively reverse
the laissez-faire outcome.
A ﬁnal point deserves attention here. When trade barriers are suﬃciently
low, but still positive, our model too features a core-periphery outcome (un-
less λSWING =1 ). In particular, all the economic activities concentrate in
Urban whenever φ > λSWING, while sN =0and Rural becomes the core
whenever φ > λ
−1
SWING. The novelty of this analysis is that, when the po-
litical game is given the deserved attention, the deﬁnite prediction of the
traditional models on the big region becoming the core does not necessarily
hold anymore: it is not necessarily the large region that attracts all economic
activities in the end. The political environment does matter in shaping the
equilibrium geography.
Having analyzed the equilibrium location of economic activities, we can
now turn to the analysis of the equilibrium subsidy level which delivers ν∗.
5.1 The Equilibrium Subsidy Level: Does Size Mat-
ter?
As expected, interior solutions for θ
∗ are increasing in m (see (15)). Candi-
dates want to attract swing voters and the less dispersed group has a larger
mass of such voters (ceteris paribus). Hence, the wider is the diﬀerence in
the homogeneity degree of the two regions, the higher is the subsidy level
the relatively more homogeneous region receives. Besides, θ
∗ is larger than
unity and, hence, Rural is subsidized, if m>1. This departure from a ma-
joritarian result, which is due to the fact that regional policy is more salient
to a minority of citizens, is one of the sources of non-majoritarian outcomes
discussed in Besley and Coate (2000).
The attentive reader might have noticed that apparently regional size does
not matter in determining the equilibrium subsidy θ
∗. Observe that, indeed,
the economic weight λ does not appear in (15) and the region that gets the
subsidy is the more homogeneous one, independently from its size. This is
20clearly a knife-edge result that depends on the logaritmic transformation of
the CES aggregate in the utility function (1). More generally, the relative
size of the two populations matter, and the eﬀect of an increase in λ on θ
∗
is ambiguous.18 Size does matter in the expected way for the determination
of the political equilibrium geography s∗
N ≡ sN (θ
∗,s L),w i t hsN (.) given by
equation (5). The explanation goes as follows. An increase of sL conceptually
means that two diﬀerent variables are rising: the size of the electorate in (14),
which has a direct positive eﬀect on s∗
N, due to a straightforward electoral
competition eﬀect, and the labor force size, which pushes s∗
N up due to the
home market eﬀect in (5). These two forces have opposite eﬀects on θ
∗.
On the one hand, if a larger fraction of the population lives in U,t h e
equilibrium subsidy to the other region tends to be reduced as more voters
favor a lower value of subsidies. On the other hand, due to the home-market
eﬀect, an increase in that region’s size makes its equilibrium share of in-
dustry - hence, its real income - increase at any interior level of subsidy,
and hence both candidates can aﬀord setting a higher value of θ without









∗].R e m e m b e r f r o m ( 5 ) t h a t t h e
denominator of the right-hand side is negative. Also, from (16) and (5), we
know the two terms in the square braquet to be positive. The diﬀerence of
these two terms - and hence the sign of dθ
∗/dsL -i sap r i o r iambiguous and
depends on the speciﬁc functional form of the utility function. Clearly the
fact that this expression equals 0 is not a general result. It is interesting
to notice then that, when λSWING > 1, the big region becomes the core
independently from the subsidy being bigger or smaller than 1.
5.2 Core-Periphery Outcomes
It is also very instructive to look closer at the corner solutions of θ
∗.C o r n e r
solutions for θ occur when θ =
argmax
θ∈Θ Ω(θ) or θ =
argmax
θ∈Θ Ω(θ) respectively. It
is possible to show (calculations are available from the authors) that
θ







18In Appendix 3, we show that the net eﬀect is dθ
∗/dλ ≤ 0 for functional forms of u
more general than (1).
21and that
θ − θ




Consider ﬁrst the case in which the political strength of voters in region
R i sn o ta ss t r o n ga st h eeconomic strength of the voters in U,n a m e l ym<λ
(or, equivalently, the case in which the vote-market eﬀect is weaker than
the home-market eﬀect). As the two regions become highly integrated and
φ approaches unity, (17) tells us that the core is in U.I n t h i s c a s e , t h e
common wisdom according to which regional policy can only ’postpone the
unavoidable’, that is, the empty-ness of the small region, receives strong
support. For m>1,t h elaissez-faire solution would just anticipate the
core-periphery outcome, being φ
CP < 1
λSWING.
Consider now the opposite case, in which the voters in R are so homoge-
neous that their political strength completely oﬀsets their economic weakness
(that is R has more swing voters than U). In such a case, m>λ,s ot h a t
θ
∗ = θ for high degrees of freeness. In other words, as inter-regional trade is
highly integrated, the core will end-up being in the small region, R.
In conclusion we can say that
Result 6: whatever the relative strength of the two regions, whether
economic or political, if φ increases over time and gets closer to
unity, eventually, a core-periphery outcome does come out; where
this will end up being depends on the overall strength of the two
regions, and it will not necessarily be in the big region as the
orthodox theory would predict.
5.3 Further results
As it is possible to see from (15), the equilibrium level of regional aid is de-
creasing with the degree of freeness φ. Even if it might seem counter-intuitive,
this prediction is consistent with the observation that regional policy is more
and more eﬀective when transportation costs decrease (see Section 3) and
when trade is suﬃciently integrated, even a small subsidy can be enough to
change industry location. Moreover, the fact that θ
∗ decreases with φ does
not say anything about the eﬀectiveness of these aids. Indeed, location be-
comes more and more sensible to policy as φ increases; as a consequence of
this, the fact that θ
∗ is decreasing with φ does not necessarily mean that R
gets less eﬀective aid. The correct way to address this issue is to compare
22the political economy location equilibrium, ν∗,t ot h elaissez-faire outcome,
ν |θ=1 (see equations (16) and (6)). From the rural region’s point of view,
the regional aid policy is meant to be favorable if the following holds:








(λφ − 1)(λφ − m)
> 0, (19)
which is the case if, and only if, m>1 (recall that for interior solutions









provided that m>1.H e n c e ,
Result 7:t a k i n gt h elaissez-faire economic equilibrium as a bench-
mark, the introduction of an endogenous policy variable increases
the number of ﬁrms in the politically strong region. This eﬀect
is even stronger with the deepening of the economic integration.
To conclude let us look brieﬂy at the normative side of the model. As
shown in the appendix, U’s typical agent’s welfare is maximized at θ, corre-
sponding to the smallest, possibly negative, amount of subsidy to the plants
located in the urban region such that U is the core. Conversely, in R welfare
is maximized at θ = θ, corresponding to the smallest amount of subsidy to
plants in the rural region compatible with R being the core. Clearly, the
interests of the two categories of the population are opposed. In particular,
when m>1, the larger region U is worse-oﬀ in comparison to the laissez-faire
outcome, and the small one, R,i sb e t t e r - o ﬀ .
Put diﬀerently, for any pair of payoﬀs {VU(θ),V R(θ)},i ti si m p o s s i b l et o
make everybody better-oﬀ without harming anyone. This is quite obvious
since, in this setting, any variation in θ
∗ has opposite eﬀects on the welfare
of the two type of agents.19 The instrument considered here, θ,i sn o n -
distortionary in that the political-economy outcome lies on the (second-best)
Pareto frontier, deﬁned as {(VU(sN)),(VR(sN)) : sN ∈ [0,1]}.
19This is always true, of course, because θ
∗ ∈ Θ.
236 Summary and conclusion
Using a very simple model of economic geography enriched to allow for en-
dogenously determined regional policy, this paper analyzes the impact on ge-
ography allocation of regional interventions. Two regions of the same country
are considered: ”Urban”, the largest one, and ”Rural”, whose population is
assumed to be ideologically more homogenous. Voters vote on national elec-
tions for candidates or parties which are not tied to any region in particular.
In spite of the simplicity of the framework, interesting results emerge. The
size of the groups has an ambiguous eﬀect on the equilibrium subsidy. On the
one hand, if a larger fraction of the population - hence, of voters - lives in a
given region, the equilibrium subsidy to the other region tends to be reduced
as more voters favor a lower value of subsidies. On the other hand, due to the
home-market eﬀect, an increase in that region’s size makes its equilibrium
share of industry - hence, its real income - increase at any interior level of
subsidy, and hence both candidates can aﬀord setting a higher value of the
subsidy without altering individuals’ welfare: the very fact that they consist
in the largest population makes people in Urban willing to accept larger ”real
taxes” (in the form of a loss in their economic welfare). The net eﬀect of the
r e l a t i v ep o p u l a t i o ns i z e si st h u sa m b i g u o u s .
The eﬀectiveness of this aid in slowing down the agglomeration process
that comes as a by-product of the regional integration process will depend on
the relative size of the two populations: for a given amount of regional aid,
the regional policy will be less eﬀective in attracting the industrial activity in
the small region if the relative size of the two regions is larger (this is a con-
sequence of the well known (economic) home-market eﬀect; Krugman, 1980).
Thus, the political factor determines the amount of aid and the economic one
decides its eﬀectiveness.
The same existence of regional policy as a political issue may even re-
verse the regional specialization pattern predicted by economic theory. If the
small region is much more homogenous compared to the large one, then re-
gional policy might do even better than just slowing down the agglomeration-
in-Urban process that goes along with the deepening of trade integration.
Eventually the eﬀects of the regional intervention can dominate the eco-
nomic home-market eﬀe c ta n dm a k et h ec o r ee n du pi nt h es m a l lr e g i o n ,
giving rise to what we call the vote-market eﬀect. At the political economy
equilibrium, integration fosters agglomeration in the big region if its relative
economic strength overcomes its eventual relative political weakness. Thus
24the political eﬀect may lead to predictions other than the ones induced by
t h es t a n d a r de c o n o m i ch o m em a r k e te ﬀect.
Literally, then, economic as well as political variables determine the loca-
tion outcome. Ceteris paribus, we should expect countries (or constituencies)
with a prominent ’rural-versus-urban’ issue to have lower levels of agglomera-
tion at any point on the integration path. All the same, if we introduced some
sort of labor mobility - in the form of rural exodus, say - this would specula-
tively make the urban regions even less homogenous (assuming it takes one
generation for the newcomers to adapt fully to the new life-style) and hence
feed back into a more aggressive regional policy, having a stabilizing impact.
25Appendix
A1. Derivation of the indirect utility functions
As can be seen from (11) and (12), θ aﬀects both VU and VR through
sN only. In particular, both the representative individual’s net earnings
w + ρ(K + KR) − T and expenditure on X are constant, as we now show.
Claim 1: T h ee x p e n d i t u r eo nt h ed i ﬀerentiated good X is constant.
Proof. Plugging the price equations into p(i)c(i),w h e r ec(i) is given by
(3), and integrating over all varieties gives the (individual) expenditure on




by deﬁnition of φ.
Claim 2: The net earnings of the typical individual are constant with
respect to θ in both regions.
Proof. Take the case θ > 1 (a symmetric reasoning would apply in the
other case). Observe that w + ρ(K + KR) − T =1+( Nx/σ + NRθxR/σ) −
(θ − 1)NRxR/σ. Using (4), this can be rewritten as:












which is identical to 1+1 /σ.
To get (11) and (12) in the text, note that ln(N + φNR) ≡ ln(sN +( 1−
sN)φ)+l n ( K + KR) and that utility derived from the consumption of good
Y is identical to the net earnings minus expenditure of X by deﬁnition of
(1).
A2. Existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium in the
platform-setting game
A2.1 Uniqueness
We ﬁrst recall the basic trade-oﬀ that faces any candidate: when increas-
ing the value of θ, a candidate (say candidate A) expects to loose (to gain)
the votes of the most indiﬀerent voters in U (in R). Swing voters are more
26numerous the higher their density, the larger the population size, and the
larger the change proposed. At equilibrium, the number of lost and gained







fR(∆R(θA,θB)) = 0,( A . 3 )
where ∆U(θA,θB) ≡ VU(θA)−VU(θB) and fU and fR are the densities of the
distributions of εUi and εRi , respectively.
Since the problem is symmetric for candidate B, the two candidates con-
verge on the same platform θ







∗).( A . 4 )
Proposition 1 Restrict both candidates’ strategy space to Θ.I fθ
∗ identiﬁed
in (A.4) - of which (14) in the text is a special case - is the equilibrium
strategy, then the Nash equilibrium (θ
∗,θ
∗) is unique.
Proof. Note ﬁrst that the slope of the Pareto-frontier - the right-hand side
of (A.4) - is equal to −
λ(1−θφ)
θ−φ .T h i st e r mi sn e g a t i v eo nΘ. Monotonicity of
the RHS of (A.4) implies the uniqueness of θ
∗.
A2.2 Existence
Candidates A and B are assumed to maximize their expected plurality
κA and 1 − κA (respectively), where
κA = sLFU (∆U(θA,θB)) + (1 − sL)FR (∆R(θA,θB)), (A.5)
is derived from (13). In this section we will look for suﬃcient conditions
such that the Debreu-Glicksberg-Fan theorem for the existence of a Nash-
equilibrium in pure strategies holds (e.g. Theorem 1.2 in Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991)). Conditions required by this theorem are (i) an o n - e m p t y ,
convex and compact strategy set Θ, (ii) payoﬀ functions κi : i = A,B con-
tinuous in (θA,θB),a n d(iii) quasi-concave in θi.T h e ﬁrst two conditions
are obviously met by deﬁnition of Θ a n db yi n s p e c t i o no f( A . 5 ) . F o r(iii)
to hold, it is suﬃcient that Fj (∆j(θA,θB)) : j = U,R are concave. The
following lemma shows that this requirement is met.
Lemma 2 Let g : S → Z be a concave function and h : Θ → S ab i j e c t i o n ,
where both Θ and Z are compact subsets of <. Without loss of generality,
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> θ > θ
00
by the monotonicity of h(·);s oω(·) is quasi-concave, as
was to be shown.
Next, we show that FU(·) and FR(·) in the text trivially satisfy the second
order conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium - conditions (A.6)
and (A.7) below. (Indeed, any smooth, symmetric with mean zero pdf does.)











































































(This proposition is a restatement of theorem 2 in Lindberg and Weibull
(1987, pp. 280-1).)
Proof. By lemma 2, it is suﬃcient to check that the RHS of (A.5) is concave
in sN,s i n c esN is decreasing in θ. The value of sN at equilibrium is simply
(s∗
N,s ∗
N),w i t hs∗
N ≡ sN(θ
∗).F i xs0 ∈ [0,1] and deﬁne sN(²)=s∗
N+²(s0−s∗
N),
² ∈ (0,1).B y c o n v e x i t y o f [0,1], sN(²) ∈ int[0,1].A l s o , d e ﬁne h(²,s0)=
κA(sN(²),s ∗
N) as A’s expected vote share when she plays sN(²) and B plays
her equilibrium strategy s∗
N.T h a ti s ,
h(²,s
0)=sLFU (VU(sN(²)) − VU(s
∗
N))
+(1 − sL)FR (VR(sN(²)) − VR(s
∗
N)). (A.8)
First, we have that ∀s0 ∈ [0,1] : h0(0,s 0)=0by Proposition 3 above.
Next, for s∗
N to be an optimal strategy for A, it must be that ∀s0 ∈ [0,1] :




















































2 ≤ 0.( A . 9 )
Consequently, h00(0,s 0) ≤ 0 if, and only if, (A.9) holds. A symmetric
argument for candidate B shows that s∗
N is her strategy at equilibrium if
(A.7) holds.
A3. When size does matter
Here we show how the functional form chosen for (1) shapes some of our
results - Eq. (15) and (16) in particular. Rewrite (1) as u = Xα +Y , α < 1.


















∗, the later independent of λ or sL.W i t hα > 0, s∗∗
N (the equilibrium
sN)i sl a r g e rt h a ns∗













for all α ∈ (0,1), and, second, that the RHS of (A.10) is increasing in s∗∗
N.
Also, an increase in λ has a larger impact on s∗∗
N than on s∗
N.B e c a u s e sN
is still given by (5), this implies that ∂θ
∗∗/∂λ < 0,a l lα > 0.I n w o r d s , i f
Urban gets larger, the equilibrium subsidy to Rural gets smaller. The same
result obtains if α is interpreted as the share of income spent on X in a Cobb-
Douglas speciﬁcation (see Baldwin et al. 2001). Clearly, choosing α =0 ,a s
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Figure 1: upper and lower bounds for θ . 
When θ >1 production in R is subsidized; When θ <1 
subsidy goes to production in U.












Figure 2: Materialistic indirect utility function. 
Dashed: welfare effects of an increase in φ.
Individual welfare








() ( ) ()
σ













R K K ln